Press Interpreter

07/08/05 -- 2pm -- At the moment when bombs were exploding in London on Thursday, July 7, the office of the British presidency of the European Union was presenting, in Brussels, a plan of action for security in the presence of, notably, Gijs de Vries, the coordinator of EU antiterrorism policy. The experts were not all surprised by the announcement of these attacks. "The British authorities have always said loudly that an elevated risk of attack in their country must be taken into account," said M. de Vries in this vein.

The European intelligence services knew that multiple Islamist cells engaged in preparing attacks have been dismantled in Great Britain since 2001. And that the August 2004 arrest in Pakistan of Mohammed Naim Noor Khan, a computer expert, had led to the questioning, in London and Blackburn, of eight persons suspected of preparing a chemical attack. Noor Khan, presumed manager of Al-Qaida's communications network, had spoken of an attack on Heathrow airport, a possibility that his accomplices never confirmed.

The fears of EU specialists were reinforced by reports according to which 70 Muslims living in Great Britain, for the most part of Pakistani origin, had joined, in 2004, the Iraqi resistance under the command of Abou Moussab Al-Zarkaoui. The return, to Europe, of "international jihadists" capable of organizing attacks is presented by intelligence experts as one of the principal actual terrorist threats.

Shortly after the London attacks, the "Iraq connection" was identified. The most serious, Al-Zarkaoui, notably had at his disposal a well-established network in Great Britain. He had access to this network through Ansar Al-Islam, the Islamist movement formed in 2001 in Northern Iraq with the support of Al-Qaida and the Iraqi regime (which wanted to use it against the independent Kurds). A source, speaking anonymously, considered "credible" the claim made Thursday on an Islamist website by a group named Secret Organization of Al-Qaida Jihad in Europe. This group announced future reprisals against Denmark and Italy for their military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Other specialists said they were less surprised because they had emphasized many times the inherent risks of the politics of tolerance long followed by the British authorities. "This is a bad moment to say this, but one must dare to say that London is without doubt paying for years of mistakes, during the course of which radical organizations of Saudis, Moroccans, Algerians, Pakistanis, Yemenis or Turks were able to establish headquarters, publish bulletins, open websites and find financing for their activities" said Claude Moniquet, director of Esisc, a center for security research.

This tolerance, according to other analysts, had a great advantage: it permitted Scotland Yard and MI5, the interior intelligence service, to amass information on Islamist groups. There has been much criticism of this strategy, which did not permit the timely identification of the commando squad of September 11, 2001, the majority of the members of which passed through London. Or the identification of Richard Reid, the man who failed at blowing up an airplane with the aid of a booby-trapped shoe. Or indeed the jihadist cells that have since been dismantled, almost all of which had a connection to radical London Islamists.

Improve the Exchange of Information

While waiting for more details about the organization of the terrorists who attacked London (the "core" group, external operatives, etc.) the intelligence services of the 25 EU member nations continue to emphasize that a single strong mobilization of forces has succeeded, since 2001, at foiling a dozen major attacks in Europe. They point out, however, that European interests have already been targeted elsewhere in the world. They are also worried about the evolution that began in Casablanca in May, 2003, followed by Madrid in March, 2004, and then in London on Thursday: because of the police mobilization, the terrorists conduct initiatives from now on at the local level, attacking targets that will produce numerous victims, such as public transportation. Such attacks are almost impossible to prevent.

Different actors emphasize that one of the only possible remedies to the terrorist threat is a strengthening of cooperation and of the exchange of information. In fact, two thirds of the necessary response measures identified after the Madrid attacks (unification of legislation, increased control of terrorist financing) have not been executed.

Brussels; from our European bureau

[Full Article]

By Jean-Pierre Stroobants

--Translated By Ramsi Woodcock

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